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INTRODUCTION 
Any study of the school choice or voucher movement in the United States will eventually 
run into questions regarding Blaine Amendments.1  These provisions, sometimes called no-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Juris Doctorate Candidate, May 2010. The author would like to thank Professor Frank S. Ravitch for his help with 
topic selection and his willingness to serve as an expert reader, Professor Kevin W. Saunders for his work as director 
of the King Scholar program, and lastly but not least, my wife, Carolyn E. Skowronski, for her unfailing grace, 
patience, and support, freeing me to attack law school with full force, and to whom I am forever indebted.    
1 Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable Choice, 83 DEN. U. L. 
REV. 57,  63 (2005); Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, 
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 554 (2003); There is scholastic debate, 
however, over what provisions are rightly called “Blaine Amendments,” and whether ascribing g the term “Blaine 
Amendment” to these types of provisions is accurate in light of the historical record.  See Goldenziel, supra note 1, 
at 66.  See also Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 69 n. 98 (listing the following thirty-eight states as having no-funding 
provisions: “ALA. CONST. art. XIV § 263 (1901); ALASKA CONST. art. VII § 1 (1956); ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10, 
art. II, § 12 (1910); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (1879); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34, art. IX § 7 (1876); 
DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1897); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1838); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1 ¶ XIII (1877); HAW. CONST. 
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funding provisions,2 generally bar a state from directing funding towards religious 
organizations.3  Towards the purported end of giving students stuck in under-performing schools 
freedom to attend superior private schools, proponents of school choice programs seek to provide 
such students either direct funds in the form of a check, or indirect incentives in the form of tax 
credits.4  Students then leave the public school system and enter a private school - often a 
parochial school5 - with his or her tuition subsidized in part by the state.6  These efforts received 
the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,7 upholding the 
constitutionality of a program in Cleveland, Ohio, specifically approving of the fact that the 
voucher program in that case offered only indirect aid to religious organizations.8  School choice 
proponent’s victory in Zelman was tempered somewhat, however, by the Court’s holding in 
Locke v. Davey9 that a state constitution could prohibit post-secondary state aid from funding a 
college student’s devotional studies.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
art. I, § 4 (1959); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1890); ILL. CONST. art. 10 § 3 (1870); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1816); 
KAN. CONST. art. VI § 6 (C) (1859); KY. CONST. § 189 (1891); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (1919); MICH. CONST. art. 
I, § 4 (1850); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1857), art. XIII, § 2 (1857); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 66 (1890), art. 8, § 208 
(1890); MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1875), art. IX, § 8 (1875); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6 (1889); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 
11 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (1880); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (1877); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (1911); 
art. XII, § 4 (1911); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1846); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (1889); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 
(1851); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (1907); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1857); PA. CONST. art. III, § 15 (1874), 
art. III, § 29 (1874); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (1889); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3, art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7 
(1876), art. VII, § 5 (C) (1876); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4 (1895), art. X, § 9 (1895); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (1830); 
art. VIII, § 10 (1830); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1889), art. IX, § 4 (1889); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848); WYO. 
CONST. art. I, § 19, art. III, § 36, art. VII, § 8 (1890)). 
2 See, e.g., Brief for Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curia Supporting Petitioner, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 
712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729. 
3 See generally id. 
4 See, e.g., Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
5 Id. at 647 (2002) (noting that a Cleveland, Ohio voucher program resulted in students utilizing vouchers opting to 
attend a religiously affiliated school 82% of the time). 
6 Id. at 645-646 (detailing Cleveland, Ohio voucher program). 
7 Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
8 Id. at 652. 
9 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
10 See id. at 719. 
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 The impact of no-funding provisions was not at issue in either Zelman or Locke, and in 
fact the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the constitutional validity of such provisions.  
The reason that concerns about state constitutional no-funding provisions arise in discussions of 
school choice programs is that school choice programs almost invariably result in students 
flocking to private parochial schools.11  For the adamant church-state separatist, the prospect of 
state dollars ending up in the coffers of private religious schools is deeply offensive to long-
established Federal Constitutional prohibition against government support of any religious 
organization.  For the school choice proponent, the ultimate goal of improving the quality of 
children’s education is paramount, and they argue that incidental benefits to religious 
organizations should not be viewed as state endorsement of religion.12   
 State no-funding provisions present a major obstacle to establishing school choice 
programs in many states, however.  These states’ constitutions - depending upon how the no-
funding provisions are interpreted by courts - stand in the way of voucher programs, as they 
generally prevent the state from funneling state funds to religious groups.13  School choice 
proponents counter, however, that many no-fund provisions are actually the result of anti-
Catholic bigotry; that the true target of no-funding provisions was specifically Catholic schools; 
and that the taint of bigotry is so severe that such no-funding provisions cannot withstand 
constitutional challenge due to violation of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection clauses.14  In 
support of their argument, anti-Blaine Amendment critics point to a well documented and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See supra note 5. 
12 See, e.g., Zellman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
13 See generally Brief for Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curia Supporting Petitioner, Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729. 
14 See Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 61 n. 27. 
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damning history surrounding the failed attempts to amend the federal constitution with no-
funding language.15  
 The problem, however, is that while this extensive history surrounding the Federal Blaine 
Amendment supports the proposition that some advocates for the amendment were motivated in 
part by anti-Catholic bigotry, many no-funding provisions in state constitutions lack such 
history.16  Some states had enacted constitutional no-aid provisions prior to the time when efforts 
began to enact the Federal Blaine Amendment.17  Further, what critics deem Blaine Amendments 
lack uniform language,18 have been passed over a wide span of time by different states,19 and 
many have been reaffirmed by their respective states under circumstances that do not suggest 
awareness of the anti-Catholic controversy surrounding the federal Amendment.20  Instead, the 
best argument anti-Blaine amendment advocates have is that the tainted efforts to pass the 
Federal Blaine amendment may serve as evidence that at least some states added no-funding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See infra Section I.A. 
16 See infra Section I.B.; Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of The Blaine Amendment, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 
312-315 (2008) (noting that “many states adopted these express provisions in the absence of any controversy over 
Catholic schooling or any nativist agitation.  Michigan adopted a no-funding provision in its 1835 constitution even 
though the state lacked a significant number of Catholic parochial schools and the enactment came before the wave 
of Catholic immigration to the state. . . .  The Michigan Constitution served as an example for similar no-funding 
provisions in Wisconsin (1848), Indiana (1851), Ohio (1851), and Minnesota(1857) - all states without significant 
conflicts over parochial school funding at the time.).  After noting the absence of evidence of anti-Catholic bias in 
the historical record surrounding various state’s enactments of no-funding provisions, Green concludes “the no-
funding principle was already established as a constitutional principle before the Know Nothings of the 1850s, the 
advent of the Civil War, or the controversy over the Blaine Amendment.”  Id. at 315.  
17 See infra Section I.B.; see supra note 16. 
18 See infra Section I.B.; Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 67 (“Some states’ provisions do not even have language 
similar to the original Blaine Amendment, but are dubbed ‘Blaine Amendments’ because they prohibit public 
funding of religious schools.”).  
19 See infra Section I.B.; compare Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 66 (“Many of these so-called ‘Blaine Amendments’ 
and related provisions were enacted before the Federal Blaine Amendment debate began. Wisconsin’s constitution, 
for example, contains language nearly identical to the Federal Blaine Amendment, but it was adopted in 1848.”), 
with Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that federal legislation enabling Oklahoma to join the Union, which also 
required inclusion of a no-funding provision in the state constitution, was enacted in 1906).  
20 See infra Section I.B; see, e.g., Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 67 (noting “Michiganians, who refused to repeal their 
no-funding provision in a 1970 voter proposition, were not affected by the same anti-Catholic prejudice as Blaine 
and many of his supporters when reaffirming their so-called ‘Blaine Amendment.’”); see Green, supra note 16, at 
312-15.  
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language as a result of anti-Catholic bigotry, and as such, those amendments violate the Federal 
First Amendment.21   
However, these arguments are doomed to fail.  The historical evidence is too tenuous.  
Modern jurisprudence is too well developed to impart the admitted taint of anti-Catholic bias 
surrounding the failed Federal Blaine Amendment to all state no-funding provisions.  On the 
contrary, no-funding provisions are entirely in keeping with the doctrine of the separation of 
church and state.22  As Steven K. Green has argued, it may be the case that “as a constitutional 
event, the Blaine Amendment is insignificant.”23  
 This Note will proceed in Part I by providing an overview of the effort to add the Blaine 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.  This Part will also discuss state level no-funding 
provisions, focusing on what connections, if any, state efforts have with the efforts to pass the 
Federal Blaine Amendment.  Part II will review the Blaine Amendment as discussed by the 
modern United States Supreme Court.  Part III will examine how one might challenge a state no-
funding provision based on a history of anti-Catholic bias, and Part IV will argue that the 
historical record does not support the inference that anti-Catholic bias apparent in the Federal 
Blaine Amendment debate fatally taints state constitutional no-funding provisions. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See, e.g., Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 
2003 WL 21697729. 
22 See infra Part IV. 
23 See Green, supra note 16, at 332-33. 
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I. THE FEDERAL BLAINE AMENDMENT AND STATE NO-FUNDING PROVISIONS 
A. Federal Blaine Amendment Efforts 
 The history surrounding the efforts to add the Blaine Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution is well documented, and shall be summarized here.24  Maine Representative James 
Blaine offered the amendment on December 14, 1875,25 which read as follows: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of 
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands devoted 
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so 
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.26   
 By its terms, the amendment would appear to accomplish two things: apply the First 
Amendment’s religion provisions to the states, and prohibit the expenditure of public funds on 
any school run by a religious denomination or sect.27 However, as one commentator argues, a 
close reading of the phrasing reveals one notable gap - while no money may be given to any 
“religious sect[] or denomination,” the door is left open to the teaching of non-denominational 
generic Protestantism.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See DeForrest, supra note 1, at 556-573; Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, 
and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 670-72 (1998); see also Steven K. Green, Blaming 
Blaine: Understanding the Blaine Amendment and the No-Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107 
(2004) . 
25 H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4  Cong. Rec. 205 (1875).   
26 Id. 
27 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 557; Viteritti, supra note 24, at 670.  
28 See DeForrest, supra note 1, at 564.  DeForrest notes that a prior amendment offered in the Senate in 1871, which 
sought to “prevent government aid to religious schools,” utilized similar language that “had the benefit of appearing 
neutral while at the same time effectively targeting only the Catholic schools.  The common schools, most of which 
taught generic Protestantism, avoided the careful language of the amendment that only prohibited funding to schools 
that taught the beliefs and values of a particular denomination.” Id; see id. at 570-71. However, as shall be argued in 
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 The decision to introduce the amendment has its roots in Blaine’s own political 
aspirations, which may best be understood by a review of how common schools of the time, 
while purporting to embody non-sectarian teaching philosophies, in fact openly taught Protestant 
ideology.29  In response to mounting Catholic protests, in 1872 school boards in several major 
cities banned the reading of the bible in classrooms,30 as was common practice at the time.31  
Although American common schools espoused a non-sectarian educational philosophy, in fact 
the schools were “propagators of a generic Protestantism.”32  This meant that in practice, 
students attending public schools were constantly subject to Protestant religious practices, 
including reading the King James Bible, as well as anti-Catholic rhetoric.33  One motivation 
behind having generic Protestantism taught in the schools was to assimilate the increasing 
numbers of immigrants in the “American” way of life - with “American” here meaning 
Protestant.34  However, the fact that the common schools were supported by taxes raised from 
both Protestant and non-Protestants alike was offensive to Catholics, Jews, as well as some 
Protestants.35  This climate, as well as scandal amongst then Republican President Grant’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this Note, this inference, which appears to undergird much of the argument DeForrest makes, is not substantial 
enough proof to demonstrate that many, if not all, no-funding amendments that share similar language are tainted by 
anti-Catholic animus.  
29 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 557; Viteritti, supra note 24, at 670. 
30 Viteritti, supra note 24, at 670 (noting that the school boards of Cincinnati, Chicago, and New York all voted to 
ban the reading of the bible and religious exercises in common school classrooms).  
31 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 559; Viteritti, supra note 24, at 666. 
32 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 559.  
33 Id. 
34 See Viteritti, supra note 24, at 669 (“Protestantism had been so entrenched within the mainstream of American 
culture that it was difficult for many people to understand the concerns of religious minorities. The common school 
was designed to function as an instrument for the acculturation of immigrant populations, rendering them good 
productive citizens in the image of the ruling majority.”) 
35 Viteritti, supra note 24, at 668 (“Pleas by Catholics to eliminate the King James Bible from public-school 
curricula were joined increasingly by Jews and Protestants who were also offended by the custom.”) 
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administration, provided the impetus for the move towards barring public funds for “sectarian” 
(read: Catholic36) schools as a means to distract the public.37 
 President Grant, in his annual message to Congress, proposed amending the Federal 
Constitution to “establish and forever maintain free public schools” for all children, forbidding 
the teaching of “religious, atheistic, or pagen tenets” in such schools, and banning the 
expenditure of all public funds “in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or 
denomination.”38  Following President Grant’s lead, Rep. Blaine proposed his amendment, 
which, while initially popular, was eventually criticized as “directed against the Catholics.”39 
Rep. Blaine, however, denied that he was motivated by anti-Catholic bias.40  Instead, he insisted 
that his motivation was to “depoliticize the common school issue.”41  Blaine’s true motivations 
are subject to scholastic debate, highlighting the difficulty with proving a legislator’s motivation 
for decisions made over a century ago.42  
 Regardless of historian’s abilities to prove Blaine’s motivations with certainty, what is 
certain is that introduction of the amendment allowed Blaine to secure a plurality of delegate 
votes during the Republican convention in June of 1876.43  Blaine was ultimately unsuccessful at 
securing the nomination, but the notion of the party running on a platform of barring public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine 
Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992)) (noting “it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was 
code for ‘Catholic.’”). 
37 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 557. 
38 Ulysses S. Grant, Seventh Annual Message, December 7, 1875, in ULYSSES S. GRANT, 1822-1885, at 92 (Philip R. 
Moran ed., 1968); DeForrest, supra note 1, at 565.  
39 NATION (New York), Mar. 16, 1876, at 173; DeForrest, supra note 2, at 565.  
40 Green, supra note 36, at 54; DeForrest, supra note 24, at 566.  
41 DeForrest, supra note 24, at 566. 
42 Id. at 566, n. 113. DeForrest notes that Green argues that rather than being “an anti-Catholic bigot,” Blaine was 
instead “a political opportunist,” id., noting Blaine’s “‘total disregard for the proposal once he had lost the 
[Republican] nomination’ for the presidency.” Id. (quoting Green, supra note 36, at 54).  However, Robert F. Utter 
and Edward J. Larson counter, “Blaine continued to support an amendment during the remainder of his long political 
career.”  Id. (quoting Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the 
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 464 (1988)). 
43 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 567; Green, supra note 36, at 56. 
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funding to any “school or institution under sectarian control” proved wildly popular among 
delegates at the convention.44  Congressional progress on the amendment then picked up, in part 
due to the Democratic presidential nominee’s insistence that the vote be resolved to “remove the 
issue of Catholicism from public debate.”45  Following addition of a Democratic amendment that 
“effectively reduced [Blaine’s amendment] to a statement of principles,” Blaine’s amendment 
passed in the House and moved into the Republican controlled Senate.46  The Senate revised the 
amendment, adding a provision that would allow the reading of the Bible in school.47 
 Review of debate in the Senate illustrates that Democrats objected to the amendment in 
part due to allegations that the Republicans were attempting to portray the Democratic Party as 
sympathetic with Catholics.48  Some supporters of the amendment were not bothered with 
reading the King James Bible in schools, nor the de facto reality that common schools of the time 
taught a sort of generic Protestantism.49 Instead, supporters of the amendment were most 
adamant that public funds not be given to sectarian schools.50  Following Senate debate in which 
the specter of anti-Catholic bias was a recurring theme,51 the Senate ultimately rejected the 
amendment.52 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 567. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 568. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 570.  
49 See generally id. at 570-73;  compare id. at 570-71 (“[Sen.] Edmunds ended his attack [on the Catholic Church] 
by stating that the Blaine Amendment would not prohibit the teaching of the general principles of religion in the 
common schools and other public institutions, only the teaching of ‘particular tenets or creed of some 
denomination.’”), with supra note 28 and accompanying text.  DeForrest argues that what motivated proponents of 
the amendment was anti-Catholic animosity, and not, as the text of the Blaine Amendment itself might suggest, a 
true concern with removing all religious oriented instruction from the common schools.  Id.  
50 Id. 
51 See id. at 570-72.  
52 Id. at 573 (noting the “yeas were 28 and the nays were 16, with 27 senators absent, including . . . James Blaine 
himself.”).  
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B. The Tenuous Connection Between the Federal Blaine Amendment and State No-Funding 
Provisions 
 Despite the failure of the Blaine Amendment at the federal level, many state constitutions 
contain no-funding provisions.  However, there is some debate as to the true number of state 
constitutions containing provisions rightly called “Blaine Amendments,” with numbers ranging 
from twenty-nine to thirty-eight state constitutions.53  The circumstances surrounding the 
enactment of no-funding provisions in state constitutions vary widely.54  There is even some 
controversy surrounding the use of the term “Blaine Amendment,” as it connotes a connection 
with the Federal Blaine Amendment efforts despite a lack of evidence, in many cases, of a direct 
or implicit connection.55  While opponents of Blaine Amendments seek to paint every state 
constitutional no-funding provision as tainted,56 supporters note that the prejudicial import of the 
term “Blaine Amendment” may be used “rhetorically” to conjure notions of anti-Catholic bias 
that otherwise is absent from the historical record at the state level.57  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Constitutions cited supra note 1; see DeForrest, supra note 1, at 554 n. 14 (noting varying estimate from 
twenty-nine to around thirty states); see Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 66 n. 75 (citing Toby J. Heytens, Note, School 
Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 123 n. 32 (2000)) (noting “the divergent conclusions of several 
law review articles of the number of state constitutional provisions properly called ‘Blaine Amendments’”); see 
Goldenziel, supra note 1, 69 n. 98 ; see The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, What Are Blaine Amendments?,  
http://www.blaineamendments.org/Intro/whatis.html (placing the number of state constitutions with Blaine 
Amendments at thirty-seven) (last visited March 29, 2010).  
54 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.  
55 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 66.  
56 See generally The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments, http://www.blaineamendments.org/ 
(last visited March 29, 2010); see also Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 66 (noting that “activists seem to apply the 
Blaine name and taint indiscriminately to rhetorically reinforce their argument that all of these provisions have 
prejudicial origins”).  
57 See Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 66; see also Brief for Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curia Supporting 
Petitioner at *2, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729 (“Such arguments [that 
the debate surrounding the Federal Blaine Amendment taints state no-funding provisions] oversimplify the history 
and purposes of the no-funding principle while they indict valid constitutional provisions based on the possible 
motivations of a limited number of individuals.”). 
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 Regardless of debates over proper application of the term “Blaine Amendment,” the fact 
remains that no-funding provisions in state constitutions lack uniformity.58  Some states included 
no-funding provisions before the federal debate surrounding Blaine’s Amendment in 1875-76, 
under circumstances that indicated no significant anti-Catholic motivation.59  In fact, it was 
common practice for states seeking admission to the Union to borrow language from the 
constitutions of other recently admitted states, in order to expedite their own admission.60  Other 
states were required by the federal government to include no-funding provisions in their 
constitutions as a pre-requisite to admission to the Union.61  Still, most other states that enacted 
no-funding provisions did so sua sponte, without federal pressure.62  This broad range of 
circumstances surrounding enactment of disparate no-funding constitutional provisions further 
complicates efforts to paint most no-funding provisions as tainted with anti-Catholic bias. 
 As further evidence of the lack of uniformity in state no-funding provisions, one can 
characterize no-funding provisions on a continuum as “less restrictive,” “moderate,” and “most 
restrictive.”63  The least restrictive provisions address two main issues: (1) ensuring “that 
primary and secondary public education remains free of sectarian instruction,” and (2) ensuring 
“that public educational funds will not be used to directly support private religious schools.”64 
These least restrictive provisions - exemplified by the New Jersey and Massachusetts 
Constitutions - tend to allow some indirect aid to religious schools, such as student bussing in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See supra note 18. 
59 See supra note 16-17 and accompanying text.  
60 See, e.g., Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999) (noting that Arizona borrowed constitutional 
language from the constitutions of several states admitted before it).  
61 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 67, 67 n. 80-89 (listing North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Arizona, 
New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, and Oklahoma).  
62 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 573 (“Most of the states that adopted Blaine language did so without pressure from the 
federal government.”); id. at 576. 
63 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 577-78, 587. 
64 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 577.  
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New Jersey or financial aid for college students in Massachusetts.65  The moderate provisions, 
while restricting direct aid to sectarian institutions, do not directly speak to whether indirect aid 
is permissible.66  The moderate provisions “var[y] considerably” from state to state,67 further 
complicating efforts to speak of “Blaine Amendments” as if they are all tainted by the same 
historical record. The most restrictive provisions tend to restrict both direct and indirect aid to 
sectarian institutions.68  Along the continuum, these provisions are interpreted in light of each 
state’s unique jurisprudence,69 making broad generalizations regarding different no-funding 
provisions difficult.  
 What is notably lacking in the historical record at the state level is anti-Catholic 
testimony or statements from proponents of the no-funding provisions, as was well documented 
in the federal debate.70  Of the few state court decisions touching on the issue of the relation 
between the Federal Blaine Amendment and state no-funding provisions, none has struck down 
their state’s no-funding provision due to the troubling historical background of the federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 577, 577 n. 203-04; N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, para. 3; Mass. Const., art. CIII 
(amending Mass. Const. arts XVIII, § 2, XLVI). 
66 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 578 (citing as examples “ALA. CONST., art XIV, § 263; DEL. CONST., art. X, § 3; KY. 
CONST., §§ 186, 189; MINN. CONST., art. XIII, § 2; MISS. CONST., art. VIII, § 208; NEB. CONST., art. VII, § 11; TEX. 
CONST., art. 1, § 7; art. VII, § 5; UTAH CONST., art. I, § 4; art. X, § 9.”).  
67 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 578; see also id. at 580 (“The moderate Blaine language used by these states, while 
varied in expression, affirms the same fundamental principle; direct government aid for expressly sectarian 
education is prohibited, and for the most part, so is sectarian influence in public educational programs.”).  
68 DeForrest, supra note 1, at 285 (citing as examples “COLO. CONST., art. V, § 34; FLA. CONST., art. I, § 3; GA. 
CONST., art. I, § 2, para. VII; IDAHO CONST., art. IX, § 5; IND. CONST., art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST., art. VIII, § 2; MO. 
CONST., art. I, § 7; NEV. CONST., art. XI, § 2; OKLA. CONST., art. II, § 5; WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 4.”). 
69 DeForrest, supra note 576-602 (including a survey of various state no-funding provisions, as well as notable case 
law, highlighting the variation along the continuum of provisions).  
70 Compare DeForrest, supra note 1, at 556-73(detailing federal debate, including anti-Catholic remarks), with id. at 
576-601 (surveying state no-funding provisions, without noting similar anti-Catholic evidence as exists at the federal 
level); see also Brief for Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curia Supporting Petitioner, Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729, at *5 (arguing in part that “[t]he legal rule against public 
funding of religious enterprises, activities, instruction and worship is based on principles of religious liberty and 
rights of conscience that found expression in the struggle for independence from Great Britain and the founding of 
the national and state governments,” and arose independently of anti-Catholic animus.); see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 828-829 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful 
pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow. . . . This [Blaine Amendment] doctrine, born of bigotry, should be 
buried now,” but citing only the federal debate.); see Green supra note 16, at 312-15. 
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amendment.71  One particular case that contains an extended discussion of the Blaine controversy 
is Kotterman v. Killian,72 a case from the Arizona Supreme Court.73  After finding that a state tax 
credit scheme allowing individuals to donate $500.00 to their child’s private school to help cover 
tuition did not run afoul of the Federal Establishment Clause,74 the Arizona Supreme Court went 
on to discuss the background of the Blaine Amendment and its impact - or lack thereof - on 
Arizona’s no-funding provision.75  After noting that anti-Catholic bias clearly influenced the 
federal debate,76 the court went on to say that “[t]here is . . . no recorded history directly linking 
the [Blaine] amendment with Arizona's constitutional convention.  In our judgment, it requires 
significant speculation to discern such a connection.  In any event, we would be hard pressed to 
divorce the amendment's language from the insidious discriminatory intent that prompted it.”77  
The court here appears to be saying that were there evidence of state level anti-Catholic bias 
comparable to that found in the debate at the federal level, it would be “hard pressed” not to find 
the state provision tainted by “insidious discriminatory intent.”78  In absence of evidence 
“directly linking” the Federal Blaine Amendment controversy with Arizona’s no-funding 
provision, however, the court did not appear troubled with Arizona’s provision.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See, e.g., Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); see also The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
Recent Cases, http://www.blaineamendments.org/recent%20cases/cases.html (last visited March 29, 2010) (noting 
that “federal cases have acknowledged that Blaine Amendments are rooted in nativist bigotry,” and that “recent state 
court decisions have interpreted Blaine Amendments narrowly to avoid constitutional violation,” and listing cases 
implicating Blaine Amendments). 
72 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999). 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 616.  
75 Id. at 624-25. 
76 Id. at 632-33. 
77 Id. at 624.   
78 Id. This passage seems to have engendered varying interpretations.  One commentator reads the passage as 
implying the state high court “deemed its no-funding provisions irrelevant because of [their] prejudicial past.” 
Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 81.  Another commentator read the passage as implicating difficulty in interpreting all 
Blaine-type provisions “because of the difficulty in ‘divorc[ing] the amendment’s language from the insidious 
discriminatory intent that prompted it.’” DeForrest, supra note 1, at 583-84.  However, this Note reads the passage 
as follows: If there is any direct evidence of anti-Catholic bias behind enactment of a no-funding provision, then the 
court would be “hard pressed to divorce the amendment's language from the insidious discriminatory intent that 
prompted it.”  Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.  However, absent such evidence, linking the anti-Catholic sentiment 
expressed in the federal debate to enactment of the Arizona provision requires “significant speculation.”  Id. 
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 The court further noted the irony that “the anti-Catholic bigotry that inspired the Blaine 
Amendment was displaced in many of those states [that enacted Blaine-type constitutional 
provisions] by a principled commitment to strict separation between church and state in 
education.”79  Lastly, in rejecting the dissent’s call to lend credence to decisions from other state 
high courts interpreting similar language, the Arizona court said “[i]t is difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply the intent of one group of constitutional framers to another operating at a 
different time and place.”80  The Arizona court thus explicitly rejected the notion that the anti-
Catholic taint surrounding the Federal Blaine Amendment debate could be imputed to the 
Arizona no-funding provision, specifically citing the lack of “recorded history” linking the 
federal amendment to the state constitutional convention.81 
 A further example from the Ohio Supreme Court highlights how a court may avoid 
finding that a voucher program conflicts with a no-funding provision.  In Simmons-Harris v. 
Goff,82 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a Cleveland voucher program, specifically finding no 
conflict with Ohio’s no-funding provision83 because any state aid reached sectarian institutions 
only “as the result of independent decisions of parents and students.”84  In its discussion of the 
no-funding provision, the court made no mention of the history of its enactment; perhaps, as one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 633. 
80 Id. at 625. 
81 Id. at 624. 
82 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).  
83 Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 (“The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the 
income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools 
throughout the State; but, no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any 
part of the school funds of this state.”).  
84 Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d  at 212; see also Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 71-74. 
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commentator notes, due to the fact that the historical record is devoid of discussions regarding 
passage of the no-funding provision.85  
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court also had the opportunity to interpret Wisconsin’s no-
funding provision86 in Jackson v. Benson87 - a decision lacking any reference to Blaine 
Amendments or the anti-Catholic controversy surrounding the Blaine Amendment debate.  
Similar to the Arizona high court in Kotterman, the court in Jackson upheld a state program that 
provided public funding for parents to send their children to private schools, some of which were 
sectarian in nature.88  The court found nothing controversial about the no-funding provision, and 
interpreted the provision as but one aspect of the state’s Establishment Clause.89  In fact, the 
court interpreted the state’s Establishment Clause (which contains the no-funding provision) as 
carrying the “same import” as the Federal First Amendment.90 “[The Wisconsin Constitution’s 
benefits clause and compelled support clause are both] intended and operate to serve the same 
dual purpose of prohibiting the ‘establishment’ of religion and protecting the ‘free exercise’ of 
religion.”91   
 Wisconsin has a long pedigree of interpreting its no-funding provision in this way.  In 
1890, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School-
District No. 8 of Edgarton.92 In that decision, the court found Wisconsin’s no-funding provision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 72 (citing JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 
convened January 9, 1912; adjourned June 7, 1912; reconvened and adjourned without discussion August 26, 1912). 
86 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“[N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, 
or religious or theological seminaries.”). 
87 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). 
88 Id. at 607-08. 
89 Id. at 620-623. 
90 Id. at 620 (citing State v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 678, 687-88 (Wis. 1975)). 
91 Id. at 620 (quoting State v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577, 584-85 (1974)). 
92 Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8 of Edgerton, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). 
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to be a prime example of maintaining church and state separation.93  The court even noted that 
the no-funding provision could serve to attract people of diverse religious backgrounds to the 
new state, free from the fear of government run schools promoting religious views.94  The 
historical record surrounding enactment of the Wisconsin constitution is devoid of anti-Catholic 
bias.95  Thus, rather that viewing the state no-funding provision as tainted by anti-Catholic bias, 
the Wisconsin courts view the no-funding provision as integral to maintaining religious freedom.  
 Despite claims that state no-funding provisions are tainted by the demonstrable anti-
Catholic animus that motivated some supporters of the Federal Blaine Amendment, the historical 
record at the state level is devoid of comparably incriminating evidence.  Aside from having 
similar language, or from providing similar barriers to those who wish to have the state provide 
some sort of state funding to religious organizations, state no-funding provisions were enacted by 
the individual states in highly individualized circumstances.  Some were passed pre-Blaine 
Amendment.96  Other were forced to add no-funding provisions to gain statehood,97 while still 
others enacted their provisions in circumstances devoid of reference to anti-Catholic animus.98  
In fact, some state view their no-funding provisions as in keeping with long held notions of 
separation of church and state.99  Anti-Catholic animus, which admittedly was present in 
America before, during, and after the time of the Blaine Amendment debates, does not appear in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting Weiss, 44 N.W. 967)) (“‘[T]he Wisconsin Supreme Court has touted its 
no-funding provision as ‘a more complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any religious sect, 
organization, or society than any other state in the Union,’ which is hardly a discriminatory interpretation.”). 
94 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 76 (quoting Weiss, 44 N.W. at 974) (“What more tempting inducement to cast their 
lot with us could have been held out to [new settlers] than the assurance that, in addition to the guaranties of the 
right of conscience and of worship in their own way, the free district schools in which their children were to be, or 
might be, educated, were absolute common ground, where the pupils were equal, and where sectarian instruction, 
and with it sectarian intolerance, under which they had smarted in the old country, could never enter? Such were the 
circumstances surrounding the convention which framed the constitution.”). 
95 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 75 (citing Green, supra note 24, at 127). 
96 See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1816). 
97 Viteritti, supra note 24, at 673. 
98 See supra, notes 85, 95 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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the historical record at the state level with the same degree of clarity as is present at the federal 
level.  Absent demonstrable anti-Catholic taint, all that remains are provisions that forbid a state 
from providing aid to a religious organizations - an idea entirely at home in a country that prides 
itself on a tradition of keeping government out of religion.  
II. THE BLAINE AMENDMENT AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 
 To date, the United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question of 
whether a no-funding provision in a state constitution violates the Federal Constitution.  
Research reveals no instance of a state supreme court invalidating its own no-funding provision. 
As discussed above, state courts interpret their provisions in several ways, with varying 
consequences for those who wish to avoid their impact.  Some states interpret their provisions 
narrowly, avoiding conflict with indirect aid to religious organizations.100  Others provisions are 
moderate, leaving open the question of whether indirect aid is permissible.101  Still others are 
restrictive, banning all aid, whether direct or indirect.102  Despite the incongruity of these 
disparate provisions and the differing jurisprudence surrounding their interpretation, Blaine 
Amendment critics argue that most, if not all, carry an anti-Catholic taint best evidenced in the 
Federal Blaine Amendment debate.103  However, thus far critics have failed to obtain judgments 
on the merits for the issue of whether state no-funding provisions are inextricably tainted by anti-
Catholic animosity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
103 See, e.g., The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, What Are Blaine Amendments?,  
http://www.blaineamendments.org/Intro/whatis.html. 
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 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the controversy surrounding the 
Federal Blaine Amendment.  The modern Court noted the debate in Mitchell v. Helms.104  Justice 
Thomas, speaking for a plurality of the Court, stated that the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine, 
“born of bigotry, should be buried now.”105  The Court noted that the roots of hostility to 
“pervasively sectarian” institutions could be traced to the debate surrounding the Blaine 
Amendment.106  Note, however, that this reference was dicta and not made in the context of 
adjudication of the constitutionality of a state no-funding provision.107  The pervasively sectarian 
doctrine holds that the Federal Establishment Clause is violated when “[r]eligion . . . so 
permeates [a] whole educational program that ‘direct aid’ to any aspect of that program 
inescapably aids religion itself.”108  The problem with the doctrine in the eyes of critics is that it 
impermissibly requires the government to make intrusive inquiries into religious beliefs and 
practices.109  The doctrine may be on its last legs, however, as the Tenth Circuit in 2008 struck 
down a Colorado statute that gave scholarships to all eligible recipients, except those attending 
“pervasively sectarian” institutions.110 Thus while it is true that the Court is aware of the 
controversy surrounding the Blaine Amendment, it is questionable to what extent this dicta in 
Mitchell has any bearing on state no-funding provisions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).  
105 Id. at 828-29; see The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, What Are Blaine Amendments?,  
http://www.blaineamendments.org/recent%20cases/cases.html 
106 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29. 
107 Id.  
108 Gerard V. Bradley, An Unconstitutional Stereotype: Catholic Schools as “Pervasively Sectarian”, 7 TEX. REV. 
OF L. & POL. 1, 2 (2002).  Note however that a recent Tenth Circuit decision invalidated a Colorado statute that 
prohibited granting scholarships to students attending “pervasively sectarian” schools.  
109 Bradley, supra note 108, at 24 (“Civil authorities are competent to decide, within limits, what questions to ask 
about a religion and its practice in order to protect the common good, but the answers must be those of the faithful, 
not of the magistrate.”). 
110 Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 
828) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 
F.3d 1335, 1341-42 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
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 Justice Breyer, writing in dissent in Zellman v. Simmons-Harris,111  noted that anti-
Catholic “sentiment played a significant role in creating a movement that sought to amend 
several state constitutions (often successfully), and to amend the United States Constitution 
(unsuccessfully) to make certain that government would not help pay for “sectarian” (i.e., 
Catholic) schooling for children.”112  Zellman did not involve adjudication of the 
constitutionality of a no-funding provision. Justice Breyer went on, however, to note that modern 
jurisprudence had developed a doctrine that drew “fairly clear lines of separation between 
church and state.”113  When one notes that Justice Breyer was dissenting from a decision that 
upheld an Ohio voucher program that provided indirect aid to sectarian institutions, his mere 
acknowledgement of the anti-Catholic history behind the Blaine Amendment is outweighed by 
the fact that he also acknowledged that modern jurisprudence protected the separation of church 
and state.  Critics of Blaine Amendments do not seem to have any ally in Justice Breyer.  
Moreover, as noted above, the Ohio Supreme Court had already held that the voucher program at 
issue in Zellman did not conflict with Ohio’s no-funding provision, implicitly upholding the 
provision itself.114   
 The United States Supreme Court also addressed the Blaine Amendment controversy in 
Locke v. Davey,115 albeit tangentially.  Locke involved a challenge to a state statute prohibiting 
qualified students from using Promise Scholarship funds in pursuit of a degree in devotional 
studies.116  The plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to enjoin enforcement of 
the scholarship statute, alleging violations of the Federal Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 536 U.S. 639 (2002).  
112 Id. at 721 (citing John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 279, 301-05 (2001)).  
113 Zellman, 536 U.S. at 723. 
114 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
115 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  
116 Id. at 718. 
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Clause, the Free Speech Clauses, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.117  The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty (“Becket Fund”) submitted an amicus 
curie brief in the case on the subject of the anti-Catholic history of the Blaine Amendment.118 
Becket Fund argued that all state constitutional Blaine Amendments are tainted by anti-Catholic 
bias, and thus the Court should “tear out, root and branch, the state constitutional provisions that 
have enforced religious discrimination in the funding of education for well over a century.”119  
The Court, however, noted that Washington’s no-funding provision120 was not at issue in the 
case, and as such “the Blaine Amendment’s history [was] simply not before us.”121  Thus, while 
acknowledging the problematic history of the Federal Blaine Amendment, which the court noted 
“has been linked with anti-Catholicism,”122 the court once again avoided having to directly 
address a so-called state Blaine Amendment.  
 In every instance where the modern Court was presented the issue of the Blaine 
Amendment’s controversial history, the court has found that a state no-funding provision just 
was not at issue in the case. While the Court has indeed acknowledged the Federal Blaine 
Amendment’s anti-Catholic taint, it has never clearly stated a belief that state level amendments 
are similarly tainted. As this Note has detailed, there does not appear any clear historical 
evidence linking anti-Catholic sentiment surrounding the Federal Blaine Amendment. The 
Supreme Court has never acknowledged a definitive link, and state case law similarly has not 
acknowledged conclusive links between the Federal Blaine Amendment debate, and state level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Id. 
118 Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 
21697729. 
119 Id. at 3. 
120 WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (“All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be 
forever free from sectarian control or influence”). 
121 Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7. 
122 Id. 
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no-funding provisions.  In fact, some states view their no-funding provisions as entirely in 
keeping with the doctrine of separation of church and state.123  
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO A STATE LEVEL NO-FUNDING 
PROVISION BASED ON TAINT OF FEDERAL BLAINE AMENDMENT 
 What might a successful challenge to a no-funding provision look like?  Research has 
disclosed no instance of a state no-funding provision being overturned due to an impermissible 
link with the federal debate surrounding the Blaine Amendment.  In the few instances where a 
court has spoken directly on the issue, the tenuous link between the history surrounding the 
Blaine Amendment and the state level history of enactment of the no-funding provision was not 
significant enough to invalidate the state no-funding provision.124 
 However, federal jurisprudence does contain examples of statutes being overturned due 
to prejudicial motivations behind their enactment, combined with a disparate impact upon the 
affected class.125  Romer v. Evans126 involved a challenge to a state constitutional amendment 
passed by voter referendum in response to certain communities independently passing anti-
homosexual discrimination laws, known as “Amendment 2.”127  Local governmental entities had 
taken it upon themselves to protect homosexuals from discrimination “in many transactions and 
activities, including housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and 
welfare services.”128  The constitutional amendment was intended to repeal these provisions, but 
in fact it did “more than repeal or rescind these provisions. It prohibits all legislative, executive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
124 See supra note 71-81 and accompanying text. 
125 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 97. 
126 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
127 Goldenziel, supra note 1, at 97 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635); Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24. 
128 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24 (citing Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991); Aspen 
Municipal Code § 13-98 (1977); Boulder Rev.Code §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987)). 
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or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect” homosexuals.129  
While the State of Colorado sought to justify the provision on the basis that it simply placed 
homosexuals “in the same position as all other persons,”130 i.e., deprived homosexuals the 
protection of “special rights,”131 the Court was incredulous.132  Instead, the court framed the 
amendment as withdrawing “from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the 
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”133  The 
Court noted the wide-ranging effect of Amendment 2, removing the ability from local 
governments or the courts to protect homosexuals from discrimination in public 
accommodations, “housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private 
education, and employment.”134  Amendment 2 further could be read to remove the protections 
provided by even general laws prohibiting arbitrary discrimination.135 When viewed in its 
entirety, Amendment 2 did far more than deny the state government from providing “special 
rights,” to homosexuals; instead, the amendment imposed a “specific disability” upon 
homosexuals as a class,136 in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.137  Importantly for the 
purposes of this Note, the court noted that the broad yet focused impact upon homosexuals was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Id. at 624. The constitutional amendment was known as “Amendment 2,” and reads as follows: “No Protected 
Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its 
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall 
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or 
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. 
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.”  Id. 
130 Id. at 626.  Put another way, the State tried to justify the provision on the basis of respect for citizen’s freedom of 
association rights, i.e., freedom not to associate with people whose lifestyle one finds disagreeable.  Id. at 635.  
131 Id. at 631 (“[The Court] cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does 
no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights.”). 
132 Id. at 626. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 629 (citing Aspen Municipal Code §§ 13-98(b), (c) (1977); Boulder Rev.Code §§ 12-1-2, 12-1-3 (1987); 
Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV, §§ 28-93 to 28-95, 28-97 (1991)). 
135 Id. at 630. 
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“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to 
legitimate state interests.”138  Although the Court did not cite any explicit anti-homosexual 
motivation behind enactment of Amendment 2, such as public statements by supporters evincing 
clear discriminatory intent, the Court held that the impact upon homosexuals was so broad that 
there could be no “rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”139  This demonstrates that 
the Court is willing to strike down laws enacted for no reason other than animus towards a 
particular, identified class of persons.  
 The Court also invalidated a racially discriminatory state constitutional provision in 
Hunter v. Underwood.140 Hunter involved a class action 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge to an 
Alabama constitutional provision that disenfranchised those convicted of “any crime . . . 
involving moral turpitude,” among other crimes.141  The plaintiffs, one of whom was white, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Id. at 632; see also id. at 635 (“Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes often can be explained by 
reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons. 
Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular 
protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any 
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. We conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of 
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U.S. 450, 462 (1988), and Amendment 2 does not.”). 
139 Id. at 635 (“We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete 
objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a 
relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the 
Equal Protection Clause does not permit. ‘[C]lass legislation ... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’”). 
140 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
141 Id. at 224 (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182, repealed by ALA. CONST. amend. 579). The text of § 182 read: 
“The following persons shall be disqualified both from registering, and from voting, namely: All idiots and insane 
persons; those who shall by reason of conviction of crime be disqualified from voting at the time of the ratification 
of this Constitution; those who shall be convicted of treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, 
larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of 
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the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude; also, any person who shall be 
convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of buying or 
offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to make a false return in any election by the people or in 
any primary election to procure the nomination or election of any person to any office, or of suborning any witness 
or registrar to secure the registration of any person as an elector.”  ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182, repealed by ALA. 
CONST. amend. 579. 
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other black, both had been convicted of writing bad checks, a misdemeanor.142  At trial, one 
claim was that the provision was enacted for the purpose of discriminating against blacks, and 
had in fact done so.143  The Court found that although the constitutional provision was facially 
neutral, it would be held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause if motivated by a racially 
discriminatory purpose.144  While noting that “[p]roving the motivation behind official action is 
often a problematic undertaking,”145 the Court went on to say that in this case, based on 
uncontroverted testimony of historians, “neither the District Court nor appellants seriously 
dispute the claim that this zeal for white supremacy ran rampant at the convention.”146  It did not 
matter that the constitutional provision had been “legitimated” in the intervening years; all that 
mattered was that the original purpose behind enactment was racial discrimination, and that 
effect continued from enactment until the modern day.147  Facing clear proof that a constitutional 
provision was enacted by a legislative body motivated by racial animus, the Court had no trouble 
striking down the offending provision under the Equal Protection clause.148  
 Supreme Court precedent such as Romer and Hunter can serve as a framework for a 
successful challenge to a state no-funding provision. Absent explicit evidence of a discriminatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Id. at 224. 
143 Id. at 224 (“The case proceeded to trial on two causes of action, including a claim that the misdemeanors 
encompassed within § 182 were intentionally adopted to disenfranchise blacks on account of their race and that their 
inclusion in § 182 has had the intended effect.”).  
144 Id. at 227-28 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)). 
145 Id. at 228 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982)). “Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a 
hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by 
legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this 
circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different 
matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis 
of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to 
eschew guesswork.” Id. at 228 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384 (1968)). 
146 Id. at 228-29. 
147 Id. at 232-33 (“[W]e simply observe that its original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against 
blacks on account of race and the section continues to this day to have that effect. As such, it violates equal 
protection under Arlington Heights.”). 
148 Id.  
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impact, a court could find implicit religious animus by looking at the actual impact of a no-
funding provision, such that the no-funding provision would bear no rational relationship to a 
legitimate government interest.149  In cases where clear historical evidence exists to establish 
improper discriminatory intent on the part of legislators, the court may invalidate a provision 
despite the fact that the passage of time has “legitimated” the provision, so long as 
discriminatory impact persists.150  However, it remains an open question whether the 
discriminatory intent of federal legislators expressed in debates over a failed federal 
constitutional amendment may be imputed to state legislators enacting their own no-funding 
provisions absent direct evidence of the state actors’ intent.  
IV. WHY CHALLENGES TO STATE NO-FUNDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE LIKELY TO 
FAIL 
 The historical record surrounding the federal debate over the Blaine Amendment lays 
plain that at least some legislators were motivated by anti-Catholic animus.151 Most common 
public schools of the time taught a form of “generic Protestantism” that included readings from 
the Protestant Bible and other Protestant religious rituals.152  In response, Catholics and others 
began to petition their local governments to either ban such religious practices, or, alternatively, 
to allow public funds to support sectarian schools.153 Looking for a political distraction, 
President Grant proposed, and Representative Blaine introduced, a constitutional amendment to 
ban the expenditure of public funds for any school that taught the religious tenants of a particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See supra notes 125-139 and accompanying text.  
150 See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra Section I.A.  
152 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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religion or sect.154  This would have had the advantage of barring aid to secular schools while 
allowing the continued teaching of non-denominational generic Protestantism.155  However, the 
federal amendment was not to be.156 
 Critics of the Blaine Amendment attempt to use this historical background to demonstrate 
that similar amendments at the state level were also tainted by anti-Catholic animus.157  
However, attempts to categorize all such state level no-funding provisions as so-called Blaine 
Amendments give too short shrift to the disparate nature of state no-funding provisions.158  State 
no-funding provisions were passed at different times, by independent legislative bodies, for 
varying reasons.159  To impute anti-Catholic bias to all no-funding provisions based on debate 
that took place at the federal level would seem to require far more substantial proof than the fact 
that each state’s no-funding provision accomplished essentially the same thing.  There is little 
evidence in the historical record at the state level to show such troubling legislative motives as 
were clearly present during the Federal Blaine Amendment debate.160  In fact no state court 
decision reviewing the legitimacy of state level no-funding provisions has found evidence of 
anti-Catholic bias at the state level.161  On the contrary, courts at the state level are likely to view 
their no-funding provisions as in keeping with long-established principles of separation of church 
and state.162  The historical record is too sparse, and the links between the Federal Blaine 
Amendment and state no-funding provisions too tenuous to support a blanket inference that any 
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155 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 43-52 and accompanying text. 
157 See generally supra Section I.B. 
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159 See generally supra Section I.B.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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state level no-funding provision is fatally tainted by anti-Catholic bias as expressed in the Blaine 
Amendment debates. 
 No-funding provision critics note that the United States Supreme Court has noted on 
multiple occasions the anti-Catholic prejudice existent in the historical record of the Federal 
Blaine Amendment debate.163  However, their optimism that Supreme Court recognition of the 
clear historical record surrounding the failed Federal Blaine Amendment will lead to invalidation 
of state no-funding provisions overlooks the dearth of historical evidence at the state level.  In 
Zellman justice Breyer’s dissent noted the anti-Catholic animus behind the Blaine Amendment, 
but at the same time noted that modern jurisprudence had evolved to clearly separate church and 
state.164  It seems fair to infer Justice Breyer views state no-funding provisions as entirely in 
keeping with principles of separation of church and state.  
Research disclosed no state level historical record of similar import as that demonstrating 
anti-Catholic bias in the Blaine Amendment debates.  There is no “smoking gun” in state 
historical records.  This lack of a smoking gun at the state level – despite years of debate and 
research over modern no-funding provisions – should doom efforts to try and demonstrate the 
requisite discriminatory intent and disparate impact upon religious schools necessary to 
invalidate a state no-funding provision.  In Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court invalidated 
a state constitutional amendment due to undisputed racial bias evidenced by the historical record 
at the state level.165  However, as shown herein, no similar evidence exists at the state level for 
the enactment of no-funding provisions, and no-funding provision critics must then resort to 
strained attempts to link the Federal Blaine Amendment debate to enactment of state level no-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 See generally The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Recent Cases, 
http://www.blaineamendments.org/recent%20cases/cases.html (last visited March 29, 2010); see supra Part II. 
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funding provisions. Again, this link is simply too tenuous to rise to the level of proof the Court 
found acceptable in Hunter.  Absent explicit evidence of prejudicial legislative intent at the state 
level similar to that shown in Hunter,166 state level no-funding provisions are far more innocuous 
than the Alabama Constitutional amendment at issue in that case.   
Moreover, unlike the Colorado voter approved constitutional amendment at issue in 
Romer,167 state level no-funding provisions do have a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
level interest – separation of church and state.  Thus, Romer v. Evans should also prove to be a 
dead end for no-funding provision critics. In that case, the state attempted to justify its voter 
approved constitutional amendment on the basis of respecting the freedom of association rights 
of those who disagree with homosexuality.168  However, the court replied that “[t]he breadth of 
the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to 
credit them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose 
or discrete objective.”169   
It requires no stretch of logic to understand how state no-funding provisions – banning 
the expenditure of state funds for religious schools – relate to the permissible government 
objective of separation of church and state.  In the end, one is left with the impression that 
hostility to so-called Blaine Amendments has more to do with removing constitutional obstacles 
to school voucher programs, and less to do with anti-Catholic animus dating to the 1870s.170  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra note 130. 
169 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
170 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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Conclusion 
 No-funding provisions stand in the way of state level efforts to divert money intended for 
public schools towards religious schools. Supporters of the school voucher movement face a 
difficult obstacle in state constitution no-funding provisions.  In order to cast a cloud over such 
provisions, critics highlight the well-documented debate surrounding efforts to amend the 
Federal Constitution with language barring public support for religious institutions, including 
schools.  The federal debate lays plain that some legislators were motivated by anti-Catholic 
animosity.  State level historical records contain no such analog to the federal debate, leaving 
critics to argue that the federal taint should be imputed to most, if not all, state level no-funding 
provisions.  State no-funding provisions have widely varied language, however, as well as 
widely varied circumstances surrounding their enactment.  It is simply not the case that all no-
funding provisions were enacted by legislators or citizens exhibiting anti-Catholic animus.  The 
link between the federal debate and state enactments is far too tenuous to support claims of 
prejudicial purpose and effect necessary to have a court find state no-funding provisions 
unconstitutional.  On the contrary, no-funding provisions are entirely in keeping with a 
governmental scheme that seeks to keep separate the church and the state – and to keep public 
funds out of religious institution’s coffers.  
